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Abstract 
The 2016 presidential election was a jarring event for polling in the United 
States. Preelection polls fueled high-profile predictions that Hillary Clinton’s 
likelihood of winning the presidency was about 90 percent, with estimates rang-
ing from 71 to over 99 percent. When Donald Trump was declared the winner of 
the presidency, there was a widespread perception that the polls failed. But did 
the polls fail? And if so, why? Those are among the central questions addressed 
by an American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) ad hoc com-
mittee. This paper presents the committee’s analysis of the performance of pre-
election polls in 2016, how that performance compares to polling in prior elec-
tions, and the extent to which performance varied by poll design. In addition, the 
committee examined several theories as to why many polls, particularly in the 
Upper Midwest, underestimated support for Trump. The explanations for which 
the most evidence exists are a late swing in vote preference toward Trump and 
a pervasive failure to adjust for overrepresentation of college graduates (who 
favored Clinton). In addition, there is clear evidence that voter turnout changed 
from 2012 to 2016 in ways that favored Trump, though there is only mixed evi-
dence that misspecified likely voter models were a major cause of the systematic 
polling error. Finally, there is little evidence that socially desirable (Shy Trump) 
responding was an important contributor to poll error. 
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election came as a 
shock to pollsters, political analysts, reporters, and pundits, including 
those inside Trump’s own campaign (Jacobs and House 2016). Leading 
up to the election, three types of information widely discussed in the 
news media indicated that Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton was 
likely to win. First, polling data showed Clinton consistently leading 
the national popular vote, which is usually predictive of the winner 
(Erikson and Wlezien 2012), and leading, if narrowly, in Pennsylva-
nia, Michigan, and Wisconsin—states that had voted Democratic for 
president six elections running. Second, early voting patterns in key 
states, particularly in Florida and North Carolina, were described in 
high-profile news stories as favorable for Clinton (Silver 2017a). Third, 
election forecasts from highly trained academics and data journalists 
declared that Clinton’s probability of winning was about 90 percent, 
with estimates ranging from 71 to over 99 percent (Katz 2016). 
The day after the election, there was a palpable mix of surprise and 
outrage directed toward the polling community, as many felt that the 
industry had seriously misled the country about who would win (e.g., 
Byers 2016; Cillizza 2016; Easley 2016; Shepard 2016). The unexpected 
US outcome added to concerns about polling raised by errors in the 
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2014 referendum on Scottish independence, the 2015 UK general elec-
tion, and the 2016 British referendum on European Union member-
ship (Barnes 2016). 
In the weeks after the 2016 US election, states certified their vote 
totals and researchers began assessing what happened with the polls. 
It became clear that a confluence of factors made the collective poll-
ing miss seem worse than it actually was, at least in some respects. 
The winner of the popular vote (Clinton) was different than the win-
ner of the Electoral College (Trump). While such a divided result is 
not without precedent, the full arc of US history suggests it is highly 
unlikely. With respect to polling, preelection estimates pointed to an 
Electoral College contest that was less certain than interpretations in 
the news media suggested (Trende 2016; Silver 2017b). Eight states 
with more than a third of the electoral votes needed to win the presi-
dency had polls showing a lead of three points or less (Trende 2016). 
Trende noted that his organization’s battleground-state poll averages 
had Clinton leading by a very slim margin in the Electoral College (272 
to 266), putting Trump one state away from winning the election. Re-
latedly, the elections in the three Upper Midwest states that broke un-
expectedly for Trump (Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin) were 
extremely close. More than 13.8 million people voted for president 
in those states, and Trump’s combined margin of victory was 77,744 
votes (0.56 percent). Even the most rigorously designed polls cannot 
reliably indicate the winner in contests with such razor-thin margins. 
Even with these caveats about the election, a number of important 
questions surrounding polling remained. There was a systematic un-
derestimation of support for Trump in state-level and, to a lesser ex-
tent, national polls. The causes of that pattern were not clear but po-
tentially important for avoiding bias in future polls. Also, different 
types of polls (e.g., online versus live telephone) seemed to be produc-
ing somewhat different estimates. This raised questions about whether 
some types of polls were more accurate and why. More broadly, how 
did the performance of 2016 preelection polls compare to those of 
prior elections? 
These questions became the central foci for an ad hoc committee 
commissioned by the American Association for Public Opinion Re-
search (AAPOR) in the spring of 2016. The committee was tasked 
with summarizing the accuracy of 2016 preelection polling, reviewing 
variation by different poll methodologies, and assessing performance 
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through a historical lens. After the election, the committee decided to 
also investigate why polls, particularly in the Upper Midwest, under-
estimated support for Trump. 
The next section presents several of the main theories for why 
many polls underestimated Trump’s support. This is followed by a dis-
cussion of the data and key metrics the committee used to perform its 
analyses. Subsequent sections of the paper present analyses motivated 
by the research questions posed here. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of the main findings and implications for the field. 
Theories about Why Polls Underestimated Support for Trump 
A number of theories were put forward as to why many polls missed 
in 2016.1   
Nonresponse Bias and Deficient Weighting 
Most preelection polls have single-digit response rates or feature an 
opt-in sample for which a response rate cannot be computed (Calle-
garo and DiSogra 2008; AAPOR 2016). While the link between low re-
sponse rates and bias is not particularly strong (e.g., Merkle and Edel-
man 2002; Groves and Peytcheva 2008; Pew Research Center 2012, 
2017a), such low rates do carry an increased risk of bias (e.g., Burden 
2000). Of particular note, adults with weaker partisan strength (e.g., 
Keeter et al. 2006), lower educational levels (Battaglia, Frankel, and 
Link 2008; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Link et al. 2008; Pew Research 
Center 2012, 2017a), and anti-government views (U.S. Census Bureau 
2015) are less likely to take part in surveys. Given the anti-elite themes 
of the Trump campaign, Trump voters may have been less likely than 
other voters to accept survey requests. If survey response was corre-
lated with presidential vote and some factor not accounted for in the 
weighting, then a deficient weighting protocol could be one explana-
tion for the polling errors. 
1. The original committee report (AAPOR 2017) also discussed ballot-order effects. That dis-
cussion has been dropped in this paper because there was not strong evidence that such 
effects were a major contributor to polling errors in 2016. There remains an important de-
bate about the possibility that ballot order affected the outcome of the presidential race in 
several states, including Michigan, Wisconsin, and Florida.  
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Late Deciding 
The notion that preelection polls fielded closer to Election Day tend 
to be more predictive of the election outcome than equally rigorous 
polls conducted farther out has been well documented for some time 
(e.g., Crespi 1988; Traugott 2001; Erikson and Wlezien 2012). The ef-
fect of late changes in voters’ decisions can be particularly large in 
elections with major campaign-related events very close to Election 
Day (AAPOR 2009). Both Trump and Clinton had historically poor fa-
vorability ratings (Collins 2016; Yourish 2016). Unhappy with their 
options, some voters may have waited until the final week or so be-
fore deciding. Moreover, late deciders, being less anchored politically, 
tend to be more influenced by campaign events than voters deciding 
earlier (Fournier et al. 2004). 
Misspecified Likely Voter Models 
Constructing an accurate likely voter model is a tall order for even the 
most seasoned pollsters (Erikson, Panagopoulos, and Wlezien 2004). 
When turnout patterns diverge from recent elections, historical data 
can be unhelpful or even misleading. Voter turnout in 2016 differed 
from that in 2012 in ways that advantaged Trump and disadvantaged 
Clinton. Nationally, turnout among African Americans, the group most 
supportive of Clinton, dropped seven percentage points while turnout 
among Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites changed little, according 
to the Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration Sup-
plement (File 2017). Furthermore, analysis by Fraga and colleagues 
(2017) indicates that the decline in African American turnout was 
sharpest in states such as Wisconsin and Michigan, which determined 
the outcome of the election. If pollsters designed their likely voter 
models around the assumption that 2016 turnout patterns would be 
similar to 2012, this could have led to underestimation of support for 
Republicans, including Trump. Such model misspecification could have 
been exacerbated by skews in the 2012 national exit poll (a popular 
source for turnout data) overstating turnout among young and non-
white voters (McDonald 2007; Cohn 2016). 
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The “Shy Trump” Hypothesis (Reporting Error) 
Controversy surrounding Trump’s candidacy raised the possibility that 
some Trump voters may not have been willing to disclose their sup-
port for him in surveys. If a sizable share of Trump voters were reluc-
tant to disclose their support for him, that could explain the system-
atic underestimation of Trump support in polls (e.g., Enns, Lagodny, 
and Schuldt 2017). Concern about the possibility of systematic mis-
reporting of vote intention for or against a controversial candidate 
dates back decades. Studies examining this issue have tended to focus 
on elections in which either candidate race (Citrin, Green, and Sears 
1990; Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg 1991; Traugott and Price 1992; Hop-
kins 2009) or gender (Hopkins 2009; Stout and Kline 2011) was a po-
tential factor in polling error. In the 2016 presidential election, both 
race and gender were highly salient. Clinton was the first female ma-
jor-party presidential nominee, and although both candidates were 
white, Trump’s record on racially charged issues (e.g., housing dis-
crimination, the Central Park Five, birtherism) and open support from 
white supremacists put race in the forefront of the campaign. How-
ever, a recent study suggests that the risk to polls from respondents 
intentionally misreporting vote choice has diminished considerably 
or disappeared entirely (Hopkins 2009). 
Data and Methods 
The committee used two types of data to evaluate the performance 
of polls and test the hypotheses listed above: respondent-level micro-
data sets and poll-level datasets. Given the large number of pollsters 
active during the election and the reality that all pollsters structure 
their microdata sets differently, the committee was selective in asking 
for microdata. ABC News/Washington Post, CNN, Marquette Univer-
sity, Michigan State University, Monmouth University, Pew Research 
Center, SurveyMonkey, USC/LA Times, and YouGov all provided mi-
crodata to the committee (Supplement Appendix A). 
Poll-level datasets were compiled from FiveThirtyEight (via 
GitHub), HuffPollster, and RealClearPolitics. Those sources provide a 
few pieces of design information about each poll (e.g., pollster name, 
field dates, sample size, target population, and mode) in addition to 
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the horserace estimates. For 2016 polls conducted close to Election 
Day, the committee supplemented those data with information about 
weighting, sample source, and the ratio of landline to cell phone in-
terviews, where applicable. Adding these variables was done manu-
ally through searches of individual press releases, news stories, meth-
odology reports, and pollster websites. 
When design information about a poll was missing or unclear, the 
committee contacted individual pollsters to obtain the information. In 
all, the committee reached out to 59 different polling organizations, 
and 35 responded with at least partial information. Those who re-
sponded were generous with their time and information. Generally, 
noncooperation with the committee’s requests did not have a notice-
able impact on the work, with one exception. Nearly all pollsters us-
ing interactive voice response (IVR), sometimes called robopolls, did 
not respond to our requests. IVR polls represent a substantial share 
of the state-level polling conducted in 2016. 
The committee selected two metrics to be the primary means of as-
sessing poll performance. The absolute error on the poll margin was 
computed as the absolute value of the horserace margin (%Clinton mi-
nus %Trump) in the poll minus the same margin in the certified vote. 
For example, if a poll showed Clinton leading Trump by one point and 
she won by three points, the absolute error would be ABS(1 – 3) = 2. 
This statistic is always positive, providing a sense of how much polls 
differed from the final vote margin but not indicating whether they 
missed more toward one candidate or another. The other key metric 
is the signed error on the poll margin, which is computed in the exact 
same manner as the absolute error but without taking the absolute 
value. When averaging absolute error and signed error across multi-
ple polls, the signed error is always lower than (or equal to) the ab-
solute error, since positive and negative values are averaged together. 
The election polling literature offers several alternative metrics (e.g., 
Mosteller et al. 1949; Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy 2005), but the 
committee focused on the signed and absolute error on the margin 
because they are easily compared to past elections, they reflect how 
polls are actually discussed, and they are on a scale that a general au-
dience can understand.  
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Analysis of the Performance of 2016 Polls Relative to Previous 
Elections 
In the aftermath of the general election, many declared 2016 a histor-
ically bad year for polling. This first section examines the veracity of 
such conclusions by comparing the average error of 2016 preelection 
polls to that of polling in previous elections. 
National General Election Polls2 
As shown in Figure 1, national presidential polls in the 2016 gen-
eral election were highly accurate by historical standards, resulting in 
small errors and correctly indicating that Clinton had a national pop-
ular vote lead close to her 2.1 percentage-point margin in the certi-
fied vote tallies. Final national polls in 2016 had an average absolute 
error of 2.2 percentage points, which is more accurate than 2012 na-
tional polls (2.9 points average absolute error) and roughly similar to 
polling in 2008 (1.8 points) and 2004 (2.1 points). The level of error 
in 2016 was less than half the average error in national polls since the 
advent of modern polling 1936 (4.4 points), and also lower than the 
average in elections since 1992 (2.7 points).  
Examination of the average signed error in 2016 (1.3 percentage 
points) confirms that national polls tended to overestimate support 
for Clinton. Historically, it is not unusual for a frontrunner like Clin-
ton to perform worse on Election Day than in the final polls (Erikson 
and Wlezien 2012). That said, the size and direction of the 2016 er-
ror contrasts with 2012, when polls underestimated Barack Obama’s 
margin against Republican nominee Mitt Romney by 2.4 points. The 
average signed error in 2016 national polls was lower than the typi-
cal level of signed error in either party’s direction in presidential elec-
tions since 1936 (3.8 points), and is also lower than the 2.0-point av-
erage signed error in polls since 1992. 
2. This analysis includes polls that had a final field date within 13 days of Election Day (Oc-
tober 26 or later) and a starting date no earlier than October 16. National poll analysis in-
cludes only a polling firm’s final estimate to ensure comparability with historical data. Anal-
ysis of state-level polls, by contrast, includes all polls completed within the final 13 days, 
including multiple surveys from the same firm in the same state. The exclusion of pre-fi-
nal estimates from national polls results provides a clearer historical comparison to anal-
yses by the National Council on Public Polls, which is the source of data from 1936 to 2012 
and includes only final estimates.   
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In recent elections, national polls have not consistently favored Re-
publican or Democratic candidates. In 2016, national and state-level 
polls tended to underestimate support for Trump, the Republican nom-
inee. In 2000 and 2012, however, general election polls clearly tended 
to underestimate support for the Democratic presidential candidates. 
Elections from 1936 to 1980 tended to show larger systematic errors 
and variation from election to election, in part due to the small num-
ber of national polling firms.  
State-Level General Election Polls 
Unlike national polls, state-level polls in 2016 did have a histori-
cally bad year, at least within the recent history of the past four elec-
tions. Analysis of 422 state polls completed at least 13 days before 
the 2016 election shows an average absolute error of 5.1 percentage 
points and a signed error of 3.0 percentage points in the direction of 
Figure 1. Average error in vote margin in national presidential polls, 1936–2016. 
The line represents average absolute error. The bars represent average signed er-
ror (gray bars indicate overestimation of Republican vote margin; black bars indi-
cate overestimation of Democratic vote margin). The 2016 figures are based on polls 
completed within 13 days of the election. Figures for prior years are from the Na-
tional Council for Public Polls analysis of final poll estimates, some occurring be-
fore the 13-day period.  
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overestimating support for Clinton. In the four prior presidential elec-
tions, the average absolute error in state polls ranged from 3.2 to 4.6 
(Figure 2). 
Both absolute errors and signed errors were smaller in battle-
ground states than in non-battleground states (Supplement Appen-
dix B). The average absolute error for the 206 battleground state polls 
was 3.6 points, compared with 6.5 points for the 216 polls in non-bat-
tleground states. The polls in non-battleground states underestimated 
Trump’s vote margin against Clinton by 3.6 points on average (signed 
error); the underestimation of Trump’s standing was 2.3 points in bat-
tleground states. 
While the absolute errors tended to be lower in the more compet-
itive states, underestimation of support for Trump was substantial 
and problematic in several consequential states. Wisconsin polls ex-
hibited the largest average signed error (6.5 points), with polls there 
Figure 2. Average error in vote margin in state presidential polls, 2000– 2016. The 
line represents average absolute error. The bars represent average signed error (gray 
bars indicate overestimation of Republican vote margin; black bars indicate overes-
timation of Democratic vote margin). Source.— Figures for 2000 to 2012 computed 
from data made public by FiveThirtyEight.com.  
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showing Clinton ahead by between two and 12 points in the final two 
weeks before she narrowly lost the state by less than one point. Sim-
ilarly, before Clinton lost Pennsylvania and Michigan, polls in those 
states showed her with roughly three-point leads on average, which 
led to average signed errors of 4.2 and 3.5 points in those respective 
states. Underestimation of support for Trump was smaller in Florida, 
Arizona, and Georgia, while polls in Colorado and Nevada tended to 
overestimate his support. 
The Performance of Primary and Caucus Polls 
The 2016 presidential primary polls generally performed on par rel-
ative to past elections. Table 1 provides a summary. This analysis is 
based on all publicly released state-level polls conducted in the final 
two weeks before each state’s Republican and Democratic primaries. 
This totaled 457 state primary polls, including 212 polls in the Repub-
lican primaries and 245 polls in the Democratic primaries. The polls 
correctly pointed to the winner in 86 percent of the 78 primaries with 
poll data available. The average absolute error across all primary polls 
reviewed was 9.3 points, not dramatically different, though slightly 
higher than errors in primary polls from recent elections. Supple-
ment Appendix C provides additional analysis of the performance of 
primary and caucus polls. 
Differences in Poll Accuracy by Survey Design 
One limitation of aggregate analysis of polling errors is that it glosses 
over potentially important variation in performance by poll design. 
Given the diversity of designs currently in use, evidence of such vari-
ation would potentially be informative for election survey research-
ers and consumers. Many pollsters continue to use live telephone 
Table 1. Performance of presidential primary polls by year 
 2000  2004  2008  2012  2016 
% Polls predicting winner  99%  100%  79%  64%  86% 
Average absolute error  7.7  7.0  7.6  8.3  9.3 
Number of polls  172  129  555  195  457 
Kennedy et al.  in Public Opinion Quarterly 82 (2018)     12
interviewing with random-digit-dial (RDD) samples of landlines and 
cell phones in the United States. Other pollsters conduct their sur-
veys online, typically using opt-in samples of internet users. A third 
common approach is interactive voice response (IVR) either alone or 
in combination with an online opt-in sample. Nearly all IVR samples 
and an increasing number of live telephone samples are being drawn 
not from the RDD frames of all telephone numbers but instead from 
state-based voter registration files (“registration-based sampling,” or 
RBS). While campaign pollsters have been using RBS for some time, 
the widespread use of RBS is a fairly recent development in public 
polls (Cohn 2014). 
The committee examined two main design features for their ef-
fects on accuracy: mode of administration (e.g., live phone, internet, 
or IVR) and sample source (e.g., RDD, RBS, or opt-in internet users). 
These variables were coded for all national preelection surveys and 
battleground state surveys conducted in the final 13 days of the gen-
eral election. The data are summarized in Figure 3. In terms of mode, 
national polls were twice as likely to be conducted by live telephone 
as battleground state polls (36 versus 18 percent, respectively). Bat-
tleground state polls were about twice as likely to be conducted us-
ing some form of IVR as national polls (41 versus 18 percent, respec-
tively). The share of polls conducted using the internet was basically 
the same for national and state-level polling. 
Figure 4 gets to the central question of whether polls with certain 
types of designs were more accurate than others. Sample sizes for this 
analysis are small, and the effects from mode and sample source are 
to some extent confounded with house effects, such as differences in 
the likely voter model used. Still, IVR polls tended to exhibit somewhat 
less error in the 2016 general election than live telephone or internet 
polls. Battleground state polls that just used IVR had an average ab-
solute error of 2.8 percentage points. By contrast, battleground state 
polls conducted using RDD with live phone and online opt-in had av-
erage errors of 3.8 and 3.9 points, respectively. Among national polls, 
none was conducted using just IVR. The national polls conducted by 
IVR and supplemented with an online sample had an average abso-
lute error of 1.2 points, as compared with 1.6 for live telephone and 
1.5 for online opt-in polls. OLS regression analysis controlling for the 
potentially confounding effects from the specific contest polled and 
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Figure 3. Design of 2016 general election polls conducted in final 13 days. The Frank-
lin Pierce and Data Orbital polls, which were conducted by live telephone and had 
ambiguous statements about sample source that suggested RDD (but were not to-
tally clear), are coded as live phone (RDD).  
Figure 4. Average absolute error for 2016 general election polls, by design. Figures 
based on polls conducted during the final 13 days. Sample sizes for this analysis are 
small, and the effects from mode and sample source are to some extent confounded 
with house effects. National poll averages are based on seven polls (IVR+internet), 
14 polls (live phone RDD) and 15 polls (internet opt-in). Battleground-state poll av-
erages are based on 29 polls (IVR), 13 (live phone RBS), 34 polls (IVR+internet), 20 
polls (IVR+live phone), 25 polls (live phone RDD), and 78 polls (internet opt-in).  
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number of days from Election Day corroborated the bivariate finding 
that polls using IVR tended to have less error in the 2016 general elec-
tion (Supplement Appendix B). 
The fact that IVR-only polls did relatively well is interesting in light 
of federal regulations dictating that IVR can only be used with land-
line numbers and about half of adults do not have landlines (Blum-
berg and Luke 2016). This half of the population would not have any 
chance of selection in an IVR sample, assuming that cell phone num-
bers were flagged and purged before the IVR dialing began. Such sub-
stantial noncoverage may increase the risk of bias.3  
On the other hand, adults who have dropped their landline in fa-
vor of a cell phone or never had a landline to begin with tend to be 
younger and more racially and ethnically diverse than adults acces-
sible by landline. These cell-only adults are more likely to be Demo-
cratic. In the 2016 election, in which turnout among African Ameri-
cans and younger voters was not particularly high, undercoverage of 
cell-phone-only voters appears not to have been a major problem and 
may help explain why IVR-only polls performed relatively well. In fact, 
when IVR polls were supplemented with an online component to cap-
ture cell-phone-only voters, they did slightly worse. Analysis of na-
tional polling errors by mode in recent elections (Online Supplement 
Appendix B) shows that IVR-only polls fared worse than other modes 
in both 2008 and 2012—elections in which Democratic turnout was 
relatively high. This suggests that the IVR results in 2016 may be an 
election-specific phenomenon related to the particular turnout pat-
terns that year. 
Evidence for Theories about Why Polls Underestimated  
Trump’s Support 
This section focuses on testing the major theories about why many 
general election polls underestimated support for Donald Trump. 
3. A review of methodological reports for IVR polls found that the commonly held assump-
tion that such polls only dial landlines (Cassino 2016; Clinton and Rogers 2013; Cohn 2014; 
Enten 2012; Jackson 2016; Pew Research Center 2016) is not always correct. At least two 
pollsters described their methodology as IVR and yet reported that a noticeable share (10 
to 25 percent) of their completed interviews were with cell phones.   
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Weighting: Education Was Strongly Correlated with Survey 
Participation and Presidential Vote 
One hypothesis about 2016 polling errors is that pollsters did not in-
terview enough white voters without a college degree (Silver 2016). 
Indeed, numerous studies have shown that adults with less formal ed-
ucation tend to be underrepresented in surveys (Battaglia, Frankel, 
and Link 2008; Link et al. 2008; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Pew Re-
search Center 2012, 2017a). Generally speaking, this well-established 
education skew need not bias estimates. Many pollsters adjust their 
samples to population benchmarks for education in order to address 
this very issue. As long as the pollster accounts for the underrepre-
sentation of less educated adults in their weighting, this issue would 
not lead to bias, so long as the less educated adults they did interview 
were representative of the ones they did not interview. 
Why would overrepresentation of college graduates have under-
mined polls in 2016 but not previous elections? The answer is that 
in 2016 the presidential vote was strongly and fairly linearly related 
to education; the more formal education a voter had, the more likely 
they were to vote for Clinton (right-hand panel in Figure 5). Histori-
cally, that has not been the case. In other modern US elections, pres-
idential vote (defined here as support for the Democratic candidate) 
exhibited a U-shaped or “curvilinear” pattern with respect to edu-
cation. For example, as shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 5, in 
2012 both the least-educated and most-educated voters broke heavily 
Figure 5. Democratic presidential vote margin in 2012 and 2016 by voter education 
level and geography. Source.—NEP national exit poll (2012, 2016).  
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for Barack Obama, while those in the middle (with some college or a 
bachelor’s degree) split roughly evenly for Mitt Romney and Barack 
Obama. Thus, the effects of weighting for education (or not) differ in 
2012 versus 2016. 
In 2012, the postgraduate voters who are likely to be overrepre-
sented in polls that are not adjusted for education voted in much the 
same way as the low-education voters that such polls underrepre-
sent. By contrast, in 2016, highly educated voters were poor proxies 
for the voters at the lowest education levels nationally and in the piv-
otal states in the Upper Midwest.  
Following the election, two different state-level pollsters who had 
not adjusted for education in their preelection estimates reweighted 
their data to account for education. Both pollsters found that adjusting 
for education meaningfully improved their polls’ accuracy by reducing 
estimates of Clinton support. The final University of New Hampshire 
(UNH) poll had Clinton leading by 11 points. She ultimately won by a 
razor-thin 0.4-point margin. According to UNH poll director Andrew 
Smith (in email correspondence): “We have not weighted by level of 
education in our election polling in the past and we have consistently 
been the most accurate poll in NH (it hasn’t made any difference and 
I prefer to use as few weights as possible), but we think it was a ma-
jor factor this year. When we include a weight for level of education, 
our predictions match the final number.” Indeed, as shown in Figure 
6, had the UNH poll adjusted for education in 2016, that single mod-
ification would have removed essentially all of the error. The educa-
tion-adjusted estimates showed a tied race. 
The story is similar, though less dramatic, for Michigan State Uni-
versity’s (MSU) State of the State Poll. That poll, which like the UNH 
poll was conducted via live phone with a dual-frame RDD sample, 
showed Clinton leading Trump in Michigan by 17 points.4 She ulti-
mately lost that contest by a slim margin (0.2 points). The MSU poll 
did not adjust for education, but if it had, Clinton’s estimated lead 
would have been 10 points instead of 17. One other noteworthy feature 
of the MSU poll is that unlike the UNH poll, it was fielded relatively 
4. An early release of the MSU poll reported a 20-point Clinton lead (http://msutoday.msu.
edu/_/pdf/assets/2016/state-of-state-survey.pdf). The corresponding microdataset pro-
vided to the committee, presumably reflecting the final release, gives a 17-point Clinton 
lead, as shown in Figure 6.  
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early, with most interviews completed before mid-October. Thus, the 
MSU poll largely missed what appears to be a significant, late shift in 
support to Trump (Blake 2016). As discussed below, the national exit 
poll indicates that about 13 percent of Michigan voters made their 
presidential vote choice in the final week of the campaign, and that 
group went for Trump by about an 11-point margin.  
To better understand the scope of this issue, the committee inves-
tigated how many polls in key races did or did not adjust for respon-
dent education in their weighting. This effort required manual investi-
gation and coding of each poll, so it was performed on a subset of the 
state contests (FL, OH, MI, NC, PA, WI) in addition to national polls. 
Only polls conducted in the final two weeks and only each pollster’s 
final poll (to avoid double-counting pollsters who fielded more than 
one poll in the final weeks) were considered.5  
Figure 6. Poll estimates with and without weighting adjustment for education, rel-
ative to 2016 presidential vote outcome. Source.—University of New Hampshire poll 
conducted November 3–6, 2016, with 707 likely voters. Michigan State University 
poll conducted September 1–October 30, 2016, with 743 likely voters.  
5. This yielded an analytic dataset with 102 polls. Despite outreach efforts to individual poll-
sters, we were unable to determine whether 17 of these polls had adjusted on education. 
Most of these undetermined polls (15 of the 17) featured at least some IVR and at least some 
voter file sample. Virtually all polls of this type that did disclose their weighting variables 
did not adjust on education. We therefore felt reasonably comfortable assuming that polls 
with missing weighting information did not adjust for education. This imputation rule may 
be incorrect for a handful of polls, but based on the data that are present, it is highly un-
likely that the imputation rule is wrong for a meaningful number of polls in this analysis. 
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Table 2 shows that most state-level polls did not adjust for educa-
tion in weighting, whereas about half of national polls did. In Michi-
gan, under one-fifth of polls adjusted for education, while in Ohio just 
over one-third (36 percent) did so. The polls in other decisive states 
fell somewhere in between. 
One contributor to this lack of accounting for education in weight-
ing adjustments is that in 2016 the modal state-level poll was an IVR 
poll that drew its sample from a voter file and may or may not have 
fielded a supplemental opt-in online sample. Voter file samples pro-
vide pollsters with useful information about the poll respondents and 
nonrespondents. This information, which is frequently used in weight-
ing adjustments, includes voter age, gender, geography, party regis-
tration, past voting history and, for some states, race. Some polls also 
adjust their weights with modeled data for the likelihood of voting. 
Education, however, is not on the voter file and is generally absent 
from the weighting protocols of polls sampling off the voter file. Poll-
sters who sample from the voter file could adjust for education using 
some other source, such as the Current Population Survey, but most 
of them did not do so. 
It appears that a number of IVR pollsters who sampled from voter 
files did not even measure respondent education. Table 3 shows that 
in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin only about half of the IVR 
pollsters were measuring respondent education, based on their press 
releases (which show gender, race, and other demographics). 
We use the CPS Voting and Registration Supplement as benchmark 
data for the demographic profile of the voting electorate in 2016. The 
Table 2. Share of pollsters that adjusted on education in weighting 
 Share of polls that  Number of  
Type of poll  weighted for education  final polls 
Michigan polls  18%  11 
Wisconsin polls  27%  11 
North Carolina polls  29%  14 
Florida polls  31%  16 
Pennsylvania polls  33%  18 
Ohio polls  36%  11 
National polls  52%  21 
Figures reflect only polls fielded in the final two weeks and only a given pollster’s final poll. 
The requisite weighting information was missing for 23 polls, which were all imputed as not 
weighting on education, based on information among similar polls that did disclose their 
weighting variables.  
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comparison shows that IVR polls overrepresented college graduates by 
at least 10 percentage points in critical Upper Midwest states (Table 
3). Given that higher education levels were strongly associated with 
support for Clinton, the overrepresentation of more highly educated 
voters and not accounting for education in weighting contributed to 
errors in these states. 
Did Polls Underrepresent Staunchly Pro-Trump Areas? 
One question raised by the analysis above is whether the education 
imbalance was the only prevalent nonresponse bias in 2016 polls—or 
were there more? Nonresponse bias is notoriously hard to test, but 
one ecological analysis was possible. This analysis leveraged informa-
tion about which parts of the country were staunchly pro-Trump and 
how many people live in those areas versus the rest of the country. If 
polls systematically failed to interview people in staunchly pro-Trump 
areas, we would expect to find residents of such counties underrep-
resented in polls. For example, if the Census shows that 13 percent of 
Americans live in staunchly pro-Trump areas, but polls estimate that 
only 9 percent of Americans live in those same areas, that would be 
evidence that polls were, indeed, systematically missing Trump sup-
porters. However, there was no evidence to that effect. The results are 
presented in Table 4. 
Since there was no obvious, definitive way to define a “staunchly 
pro- Trump” area, three definitions were tested. The definition used 
in the first row of the table identifies counties in which Trump won 
Table 3. Share of college graduates in interactive voice response polls relative to the Current 
Population Survey in three states 
                   Michigan                              Pennsylvania                            Wisconsin 
CPS benchmark  38%  CPS benchmark  36%  CPS benchmark  37% 
Gravis  53%  Gravis  57%  Emerson  48% 
Emerson College  48%  Emerson College  54%  Mitchell  N/A 
Mitchell Research  N/A  Harper  54%  Trafalgar  N/A 
Trafalgar Group  N/A  Trafalgar Group  N/A  PPP  N/A 
EPIC/MRA  N/A  PPP  N/A 
PPP  N/A 
Benchmark data are weighted, filtered on self-reported voters, and come from the Novem-
ber 2016 Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement. Election poll data 
come from pollster press releases and appear to be weighted. “N/A” indicates that respon-
dent education level does not appear to have been measured in the poll.  
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by at least a 40-point margin. The definition used in the second row 
identifies counties in which Trump won by at least a 60-point mar-
gin. Finally, the third row simply identifies rural counties, defined as 
those with a population density of fewer than 50 people per square 
mile. The rural definition was motivated by the fact that Trump, 
like most Republican presidential candidates, generally had much 
stronger support in rural areas than metropolitan areas. Census es-
timates for the share of the population living in areas identified us-
ing each of these three definitions come from the 2015 Census pop-
ulation estimates. Poll estimates come from two microdatasets that 
contained the requisite county-level information—the mid- October 
CNN/ORC poll (n = 1,017) and a cumulative dataset with all 15,812 
telephone interviews that Pew Research Center conducted in 2016 
political polling.6   
If the polls systematically missed people in staunchly pro-Trump 
areas, then the figures in the unweighted estimate columns would be 
noticeably lower than the Census benchmarks in the second column. 
If such a pattern was not fixed by the weighting, then the estimates in 
Table 4. Estimates of the share of US adults living in staunchly pro-Trump counties 
                                                                                               Share of the US population living in those areas 
                                                                                                                       CNN/ORC poll                    Pew Research poll 
Three definitions of staunchly  Number   Census  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted 
pro-Trump areas  of counties  Benchmark  estimate  estimate  estimate  estimate 
Counties Trump won by 40+ points  1,486  13%  16%  16%  13%  13% 
Counties Trump won by 60+ points  524  3%  4%  4%  3%  3% 
Rural counties (< 50 people/mi2)  1,657  9%  12%  12%  9%  10% 
The Census figures are based on people of all ages. Census figures are 2015 population estimates. CNN/ORC estimates based 
on 1,017 interviews conducted October 20–23, 2016. Pew data are based on a cumulated file with all 15,812 interviews con-
ducted in routine dual-frame RDD surveys in 2016. The CNN/ORC and Pew figures are based on people age 18 or older.  
6. As stated in the footnote of Table 4, the Census figures are based on all ages and the CNN/
ORC and Pew Research Center figures are based on all adults age 18 or older. Analyses in-
dicated that the discrepancy did not confound the comparison in a noticeable way. While it 
seemed possible that rural and other staunchly pro-Trump areas skew slightly older than 
other parts of the country, there was no empirical evidence of that. For example, the pre-
dominantly rural and overwhelmingly pro-Trump states of Oklahoma and Wyoming rep-
resented equal shares of the entire US population (1.2 and 0.2 percent, respectively) and 
the US adult population (also 1.2 and 0.2 percent, respectively). Consequently, this small 
discrepancy has no meaningful impact on the results or conclusions in this analysis.  
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the weighted estimate columns would also be noticeably lower than 
the Census benchmarks. Neither of those patterns is present in the 
data. If anything, people living in the most pro-Trump parts of the 
country are slightly overrepresented. 
These findings do not rule out the possibility that differential non-
response was a factor in 2016. It is possible that the people inter-
viewed in these pro- Trump areas were not representative with re-
spect to their vote choice. It is also important to note that this analysis, 
based on telephone RDD polling data, may not generalize to online opt-
in polls or IVR polls. Even with these caveats, it is informative that 
this particular test, which we expected might detect underrepresen-
tation of pro-Trump areas, does not show evidence of bias. 
Likely Voter Modeling 
The 2012 voting electorate was not a particularly good model for the 
2016 voting electorate in key states. While the change in turnout may 
explain some of the polling error in 2016, just how much is difficult 
to quantify. Some pollsters lean heavily on the assumption that the 
past election is the best possible model of the coming election, but 
others do not (Supplement Appendix D discusses various approaches 
to likely voter modeling). 
One straightforward way to evaluate how well a poll predicted 
turnout is to validate which respondents voted and which did not. 
Such an exercise can shed light on how accurately the pollster’s meth-
ods identified likely voters, and on whether either nonvoters included 
in the sample or actual voters left out contributed to any error in esti-
mating the ultimate result. Unfortunately, a full validation is neither 
easy nor feasible for the vast majority of public polls. Polls conducted 
by telephone rarely attempt to ask and record the full name and street 
address of every respondent—the information necessary to attempt 
anything approaching a complete match to official records. Practi-
cally speaking, the surveys most able to validate turnout are those that 
sampled directly from voter lists and interviewed specific voters, by 
name, allowing for a full match to voter file data. In such instances, 
the match back to vote history records is relatively straightforward, 
once the voter files have been updated to include 2016 turnout data. 
Very few surveys whose results were made public in 2016 sam-
pled from voter lists in a way that readily facilitates validation. One 
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example involves a series of polls conducted for the College of William 
and Mary by Target Smart, a Democratic-aligned data firm. A postelec-
tion analysis found that their respondents who actually voted were 
more likely to support Trump than respondents who did not vote. Ex-
cluding the validated nonvoters moved their estimate of Trump’s per-
centage of the two-party (Trump and Clinton) vote in Ohio from 51 to 
53 percent. Trump received 54 percent of the two-party vote in that 
state. Another way to assess the effect of likely voter modeling on ac-
curacy is with microdata. 
One possible scenario is that the raw data collected by pollsters in 
key battleground states was relatively accurate, but well-intentioned 
demographic adjustments or likely voter modeling led the polls astray. 
Figure 7 shows the signed error on the presidential vote margin for 
polls in four key battleground states. For each poll, the weighted likely 
voter (LV) estimate is shown in black, the weighted registered voter 
Figure 7. Signed error on 2016 presidential vote margin by poll, level of modeling, 
and state. The Marquette University poll was fielded October 27–30, 2016. The Sur-
veyMonkey polls were all fielded November 1–7, 2016. The Monmouth University 
polls were fielded October 15–18, 2016 (Wisconsin), October 20–23, 2016 (North 
Carolina), and October 29–November 1, 2016 (Pennsylvania). The CNN/ORC polls 
were fielded October 10–15, 2016 (North Carolina), and October 27–November 1, 
2016 (Pennsylvania and Florida).  
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(RV) estimate is shown in gray, and the unweighted RV estimate is 
shown in white.7 The higher the value, the more the estimate over-
stated support for Clinton, relative to the election outcome. It is im-
portant to note that several of the polls included in the analysis were 
fielded more than two weeks out from Election Day and were not in-
tended to be a final projection of the contest.  
The results point to inconsistent effects from weighting and likely 
voter modeling across polls. In the SurveyMonkey polls, conducted on-
line with op-tin sample, the weighting clearly helped improve accu-
racy. The likely voter model, however, tended to have little effect on 
SurveyMonkey’s estimates for the states examined. The pattern for 
CNN/ORC polls, conducted by live telephone with RDD sample, was 
quite different. CNN/ORC’s unweighted data was basically spot on 
the margin in Florida and quite close in Pennsylvania. In those states, 
weighting and likely voter modeling increased the signed error by sev-
eral percentage points, making the final figures too Democratic. Non- 
Hispanic blacks constituted 10 percent of CNN/ORC’s unweighted RV 
sample in Florida but 14 percent of the weighted LV sample. Since the 
poll had blacks favoring Clinton by 92 points, that adjustment (which 
probably would have improved accuracy in an election with higher 
Democratic turnout) had the net effect of pushing the published mar-
gin farther from the vote outcome. The CNN/ORC data in Pennsyl-
vania tell the same story. In North Carolina, by contrast, likely voter 
modeling improved the CNN/ORC poll. 
In Wisconsin, statistically adjusting the data slightly helped the 
Marquette University poll and slightly hurt the Monmouth Univer-
sity poll. In both cases, additional analysis revealed that the weight-
ing and/or likely voter modeling had virtually no effect on the race 
distribution. The Marquette poll weighting, however, noticeably re-
duced the influence of college graduates (by 12 percentage points), 
while the Monmouth weighting did not. 
This analysis demonstrates that different pollsters made differ-
ent assumptions about the education and race/ethnicity profile of 
the voting electorate in 2016. In these battleground states, weighting 
down college graduates helped improve accuracy while weighting up 
non-Hispanic blacks appears to have reduced accuracy. This result 
7. The Monmouth microdatasets did not have a variable to distinguish LVs from all RVs, so 
no weighted RV estimates are presented for those polls.   
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comports with reporting of turnout patterns in the election. Over-
all, the analysis shows that postsurvey statistical adjustment reduced 
error in these polls, and more specifically reduced overestimation of 
Clinton support—by about two percentage points. Unfortunately, the 
adjustment did not succeed in reducing the error to zero, but the di-
rection of the effect indicates that pollsters were conscious of the fact 
that their data needed adjustment and they were, in most cases, mak-
ing the adjustments in the proper direction. Thus, statistical adjust-
ment, in itself, does not appear to be an important cause of error in 
the polls broadly speaking. 
Late Deciding: Evidence from National Exit Poll Data 
If voters who told pollsters in September or October that they were 
undecided or considering a third-party candidate ultimately voted for 
Trump by a large margin, that would explain at least some of the dis-
crepancy between the polls and the election outcome. There is evi-
dence that this happened in key battleground states and, to a lesser 
extent, at the national level. As reported by Blake (2016), the National 
Election Pool (NEP) exit poll conducted by Edison Research showed 
a substantial advantage for Trump among voters deciding their pres-
idential choice in the final week of the campaign, particularly in the 
four states Clinton lost by the smallest margins. In Michigan, Wis-
consin, Pennsylvania, and Florida, 11 to 15 percent of voters said that 
they finally decided for whom to vote in the presidential election in 
the last week. According to the exit poll, these voters broke for Trump 
by nearly 30 points in Wisconsin, by 17 points in Pennsylvania and 
Florida, and by 11 points in Michigan. If late deciders had split evenly 
in these states, the exit poll data suggest that Clinton may have won 
both Florida and Wisconsin, although probably not Michigan or Penn-
sylvania, where Trump either won or tied among those deciding be-
fore the final week. The pattern was not as strong nationally. The re-
sults are presented in Table 5. 
These results suggest that many polls were probably fairly accurate 
at the time they were conducted. Clinton may very well have been tied, 
if not ahead, in at least three of these states roughly a week to two 
weeks out from Election Day. In that event, what was wrong with the 
polls was projection error (their ability to predict what would happen 
days or weeks later on November 8), not a fundamental problem with 
their ability to measure public opinion at a given moment. 
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Late Deciding: Evidence from a Callback Study 
One limitation of the exit poll data is that they rely on people’s recall 
about when they made a decision, which is prone to measurement 
error. A callback design, such as that employed in the Pew Research 
Center’s callback telephone study, can also be informative about late 
decision-making, while avoiding reliance on recall. The Pew study 
re-contacted registered voters in Pew’s August and October national 
cross-sectional dual-frame RDD surveys. The re-interview was con-
ducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International from 
November 10 to 14, 2016. Only respondents who self-reported hav-
ing voted were eligible to complete the postelection re-interview (n 
= 1,254). 
In the callback study data, changes in vote preference manifest 
as discrepancies between pre- and postelection responses. It is also 
possible that Shy Trump responding would manifest the same way. 
Some respondents might have been inclined to censor their support 
for Trump before the election, but in light of his victory decide to be 
forthcoming about their vote for him in the postelection interview. 
If poll respondents said they were undecided before the election and 
then said in November that they voted for Trump, the explanation 
could be either that they truly were undecided preelection or that they 
intentionally misreported as undecided. For some voters, the truth 
may fall somewhere in between. 
The cross-tabulation of callback respondents’ preelection and post-
election responses is shown in Table 6. Cases on the downward, left-
to-right diagonal represent respondents who answered the presidential 
Table 5. Time of decision and presidential vote in key states won by Trump 
                    Vote choice                     Vote choice            
                      % Voters               among voters                        among voters      Estimated
                who decided          deciding in final week                 deciding earlier  Trump gain Election  
                         in final      from late (% Trump – 
  week  Trump  Clinton  Trump  Clinton   deciders % Clinton) 
Florida  11%  55%  38%  48%  49%  2.0%  1.2% 
Michigan  13%  50%  39%  48%  48%  1.4%  0.2% 
Pennsylvania  15%  54%  37%  50%  48% 2.3%  1.2% 
Wisconsin  14%  59%  30%  47%  49% 4.3%  0.8% 
National  13%  45%  42%  46%  49%  0.8%  –2.1% 
Analysis from Blake (2016) using NEP exit poll data.  
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vote question the same way before and after the election. About nine in 
10 respondents (89 percent) answered consistently, while 11 percent re-
ported doing something different at the ballot box than what they told 
the pollster before the election. In the context of recent elections, that 
11 percent is quite typical. Pew Research Center has been conducting 
callback studies since 2000. Over the past five cycles, 12 percent of re-
spondents, on average, gave different pre- versus postelection responses 
(a result highly similar to Durand, Blais, and Vachon [2001]). 
What is notable about the 2016 data is how the inconsistent re-
sponders voted. Figure 8 shows the presidential vote margin among 
respondents who gave inconsistent pre- versus postelection responses 
in callback studies since 2000. Typically, those who admit changing 
their minds break about evenly between the Republican candidate 
and the Democratic candidate. In 2016, by contrast, inconsistent re-
sponders in the Pew study voted for Trump by a 16-point margin. That 
is more than double the second largest margin in the time series (+7 
points for George W. Bush in 2000). 
The net effect on an election estimate based on such a preelection 
poll would be an error of just under two percentage points in under-
estimating support for Trump. Clinton’s estimated national popular 
vote lead based on the registered voters in this study before the elec-
tion was six percentage points, and her national lead based on those 
same individuals’ post-election responses was four points. In addi-
tion, a small percentage of those screened for the postelection call-
back survey reported not voting (about 8 percent, n = 104). Clinton led 
Trump 44 to 27 percent among those who reported not voting. Thus, 
nonvoting hurt Clinton slightly more than it hurt Trump among this 
small sample. 
Table 6. Comparing individuals’ pre- and postelection responses to presidential vote 
                                                                                 Reported vote 
Preelection vote Voted for  Voted for  Voted for other  Don’t know  
preference  Clinton  Trump  candidate  or refused 
Clinton/Lean Clinton  44.2%  0.4%  1.2%  0.6% 
Trump/Lean Trump  0.3% 38.2%  0.3%  1.1% 
Other candidate  1.6%  2.6%  6.3%  0.2% 
Don’t know or refused to lean  0.7%  1.4%  0.4%  0.6%  
                                  100% 
Source: Pew Research Center 2016 Election Callback Study. Based on 1,254 completed re-interviews 
with survey respondents who said they voted in the general election. Estimates are unweighted.  
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“Shy Trump” Reporting: Comparing Self- Versus  
Interviewer-Administered Modes 
Is there evidence for the Shy Trump theory? If there was indeed a 
strong social desirability bias against expressing support for Trump, 
interviewer-administered polls (e.g., live phone) should record lower 
levels of Trump support than self-administered polls (e.g., IVR or on-
line). For this test, all published polls conducted from September 1 
to Election Day were examined. Figure 9 shows the national trend in 
Trump support, by mode, using a local regression estimation. It illus-
trates that estimates produced by live telephone polls were similar to 
those produced by self-administered online polls. 
However, these aggregate effects may be due to other features of 
the polls than just mode of administration. To better isolate an effect 
from a mode, a regression analysis was conducted that controlled for 
length of field period, tracking poll versus nontracking poll, likely 
voter (LV) versus registered voter (RV) estimate, and change over 
time (Supplement Appendix E). The results show that self-adminis-
tered online polls and interviewer-administered phone polls both re-
corded lower levels of support for Trump than IVR polls. 
Figure 8. Vote margin (% voted for Republican candidate – % voted for Democratic 
candidate) among callback respondents giving inconsistent pre- vs. postelection re-
sponses. Data are from Pew Research Center RDD callback studies.  
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The finding that live telephone surveys did not consistently under-
estimate Trump’s support more than self-administered online polls is 
informative, though not conclusive, evidence against the Shy Trump 
hypothesis. Live telephone polls and self-administered polls differ by 
too many important factors (e.g., sample source, weighting) for this 
type of analysis to cleanly isolate the effect from interviewer presence, 
even when using statistical modeling. That said, this analysis offers 
no compelling evidence for the Shy Trump theory. 
“Shy Trump” Reporting: Experiments Testing the Effect of Mode  
on Trump Support 
In 2016, one polling organization, Morning Consult, conducted two 
experiments designed to isolate the effect of self- versus interviewer 
administration (Dropp 2016) on support for Trump. While the first ex-
periment was conducted in the run-up to the primaries and the second 
during the general election, they used the same basic design. A group 
of likely voters was recruited from an online opt-in sample source and 
asked a set of background questions. They were then randomly as-
signed to complete the remainder of the interview by either proceed-
ing with an online survey or dialing into a call center and answering 
questions from a live interviewer. The general election edition of the 
Figure 9. Support for Trump (on the sum of the two major party candidates) by 
mode. Each point represents a poll estimate positioned at the midpoint of the field 
period. Lines represent Loess estimates of change over time using Epanechnikov .65 
estimation. IVR refers to interactive voice response. © C. Durand, 2016.           
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experiment yielded a mode difference in the expected direction (Clin-
ton +5 points in the live phone condition versus +3 points in the web 
condition), but the result was not statistically significant. Dropp did 
report a statistically significant mode effect in the expected direction 
(more Trump support in the online condition than the live telephone 
condition) among well-educated and higher-income voters. 
More recently, Pew Research Center (2017b) conducted an exper-
iment that randomized mode of interview on the Center’s American 
Trends Panel, which is recruited from national landline and cell phone 
RDD surveys. Half of the panelists were assigned to take the survey 
online, and the other half via a live phone interview. That study, con-
ducted February 28–March 12, 2017, found little evidence that poll 
participants were censoring support for Trump when speaking to an 
interviewer. There was no significant difference by mode of inter-
view on any of four questions asking directly about Trump (e.g., pres-
idential job approval, personal favorability). Questions asking about 
major policy priorities of the Trump Administration also showed no 
mode effect, except on treatment of undocumented immigrants, which 
showed eight percentage points more support for the conservative po-
sition online relative to on the phone. Taken together, these experi-
ments suggest that there may have been some self-censoring of sup-
port for Trump in preelection polls, but the effect was likely to have 
been relatively small in size. 
“Shy Trump” Reporting: Trump’s Performance Relative to  
Republican Senate Candidates 
A different way to test the Shy Trump hypothesis is to compare 
Trump’s performance in state-level polls to the performance of Re-
publican candidates for Senate in those same polls. Presumably, re-
spondents who may have felt pressure to censor their support for 
Trump did not feel similar pressure to censor support for the Repub-
lican Senate candidate. If such differential censoring did occur, then 
at the individual-poll level, Trump should outperform his poll number 
by a larger margin than the Republican Senate candidate did. 
Testing this theory involved using battleground-state polls con-
ducted entirely within the final two weeks of the election. To be in-
cluded, each poll needed to measure both Senate and presidential 
vote preference. Of the 34 Senate contests in 2016, eight were held in 
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states where the presidential vote margin was less than five percent-
age points (AZ, CO, FL, NH, NV, NC, PA, WI). The analytic dataset of 
66 polls included the final polls for these eight states and, for each 
state, only the last poll conducted by each firm. Overperformance is 
defined as the signed difference between the final vote margin and 
the poll margin, where the margin is the Republican vote minus the 
Democratic vote.8,9 The central question is whether Trump tended to 
outperform his poll numbers more than a Republican Senate candi-
date in the same poll, particularly for live telephone polls. As shown 
in the first row of Table 7, no support exists for that hypothesis. In 
the 24 live telephone polls analyzed, Trump beat his poll estimate by 
1.4 percentage points on average, and the Republican Senate candi-
date beat his or her poll estimate by a nearly identical 1.3 percentage 
points on average. A similar, independent analysis reached the same 
general conclusion (Enten 2016).  
In fact, not only did Trump outperform poll estimates, so did most 
Republican candidates in competitive Senate and House races. This 
pattern is evidenced by the fact that all of the values in the first two 
columns are positive. This finding is suggestive of systematic under-
estimation not just of support for Trump but of Republican candidates 
more generally. Indeed, Republican candidates for the US House of 
Representatives also tended to outperform their poll numbers. Nation-
ally, the actual congressional vote was +1.1 for Republicans, whereas 
the final polling average from RealClearPolitics was estimated at +0.6 
for Democrats. The fact that polls tended to underestimate support 
for Republican candidates writ large in 2016 suggests that polling er-
rors were not caused by socially desirable reporting. 
8. For example, consider a Wisconsin poll showing the Senate race margin at –1 (44 percent 
for Johnson, the Republican, and 45 percent for Feingold, the Democrat) and the presiden-
tial margin at –6 (38 percent for Trump and 44 percent for Clinton). The actual elections 
in Wisconsin went +3.4 for Johnson and +0.7 for Trump. In this analysis, Johnson over-
performed that poll by 3.4 – (–1) = +4.4 points, and Trump overperformed by 0.7 – (–6) 
= +6.7 points. Comparatively speaking, Trump overperformed the poll by 6.7 – 4.4 = 2.3 
points more than the Republican Senate candidate did. 
9. “Overperformance” also can be defined with respect to the candidate’s estimated share of 
the total vote, as opposed to using the Republican-Democrat margin as described in the 
text. However, vote share was not a suitable framework. Due to the fact that polls fea-
ture undecided voters and tended to overestimate support for third-party candidates, both 
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton generally “overperformed” relative to their estimated 
vote share in polls.   
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“Shy Trump” Reporting: Effects of Interviewer Characteristics  
on Vote Preference 
Another indirect test for socially desirable reporting is to look at 
whether responses to the vote preference question varied by poten-
tially discernable interviewer characteristics, such as gender and race. 
For example, if poll respondents interviewed by white males were sig-
nificantly more likely to report intending to vote for Trump than those 
with female and/or non-white interviewers, then misreporting was 
a problem. It is possible that some respondents who knew they were 
Trump voters were reluctant to say so, even to white male interview-
ers, so this is an imperfect test. 
Two microdatasets made available to the committee contained vari-
ables for interviewer race and gender, the ABC News/Washington Post 
poll and Pew Research Center’s October poll. Because survey respon-
dents are not randomly assigned to interviewers, statistical models 
are required to estimate the effects of interviewer race and sex on re-
spondent vote preferences. In multivariate modeling controlling for 
basic respondent demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, education), 
there was no residual effect from interviewer race or gender on vote 
preference (Supplement Appendix F). The lack of evidence for an ef-
fect from interviewer characteristics on how respondents answered 
the presidential vote question is inconsistent with expectations of the 
Shy Trump theory, though it is not dispositive in ruling it out. 
Table 7. Trump’s overperformance of polls relative to Republican Senate candidates in bat-
tleground states 
                                                    Average overperformance  
                                                   (Vote margin – Poll margin) 
   Avg. 
 Senate  President  difference
 Rep.  Rep.   (Pres. error –  
Type of poll  candidate  candidate  Sen. error)  Polls 
Live phone  1.3%  1.4%  0.0%  24 
Online  4.5%  3.2%  –1.3%  17 
Interactive voice response  2.7%  1.8%  –0.9%  22 
    (alone or with online sample) 
Other  7.7%  3.9%  –3.8%  3 
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Conclusions 
The committee, commissioned by AAPOR, conducted an extensive in-
vestigation of the performance of preelection polls in 2016. While the 
general public reaction was that the polls failed, we found the reality 
to be more complex. Some polls, indeed, had large problematic errors, 
but many polls did not. In particular, the national polls were generally 
correct (with respect to the popular vote) and accurate by historical 
standards. The accuracy of primary polls was typical of recent elec-
tions. The most glaring problems occurred in state-level general elec-
tion polling, particularly in the Upper Midwest. 
The committee evaluated a number of different theories as to why 
so many polls underestimated support for Donald Trump. The expla-
nations for which the most evidence exists are a late swing in vote 
preference toward Trump and a pervasive failure to adjust for over-
representation of college graduates (who favored Clinton). In addition, 
there is clear evidence that voter turnout changed from 2012 to 2016 
in ways that favored Trump and other Republicans, though there is 
only mixed evidence that misspecified likely voter models were a ma-
jor cause of the systematic polling error. Despite widespread specu-
lation, there is little evidence that socially desirable (Shy Trump) re-
sponding was a major contributor to poll error. Experimental studies 
suggest that such mismeasurement error may have contributed er-
rors on the order of a percentage point or two, but several other tests 
of this theory found no effect. If there was a Shy Trump effect on re-
sponses, it does not appear to have been particularly large. 
One encouraging result from the historical analysis is that there is 
no systematic bias toward one major party or the other in US polling. 
In 2016, national and state-level polls tended to underestimate sup-
port for Trump, the Republican nominee. In 2012 and 2000, however, 
general election polls clearly tended to underestimate support for the 
Democratic presidential candidates. The trend lines for both national 
polls and state-level polls show that for any given election, whether 
the polls tend to miss in the Republican direction or the Democratic 
direction is essentially random. 
One broader question raised by this investigation is whether the 
polling problems in 2016 could reoccur. At a high level, the 2016 elec-
tion featured a number of unusual circumstances that are perhaps 
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unlikely to repeat (e.g., both major party candidates being histori-
cally unpopular, split outcomes in the popular vote and Electoral Col-
lege, nearly 14 million votes across three states breaking for a candi-
date by about one-half of one percentage point), but several structural 
weaknesses of polls are likely to persist. Errors in state polls like those 
observed in 2016 are not uncommon, even though 2016 was a par-
ticularly bad election for state polls. With shrinking budgets at news 
outlets to finance polling, there is no reason to believe that the qual-
ity of state polling is going to noticeably improve in the near future. 
Finally, a late swing in favor of one candidate (as appears to have oc-
curred in 2016) is not something that pollsters can necessarily guard 
against, other than by fielding closer to Election Day.   
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